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Abstract 
 
When credit application experiences are examined, minority-owned small firms are not the 
discouraged borrowers that credit outcome studies generally suggest.  This paper examines 
repeated application for credit by small firms.  Univariate statistical analysis reveals that 
persistence is necessary but insufficient for minority firms to be successful credit applicants.  At 
the same time, minority-owned firms overall were more likely than white-owned firms to make 
repeated attempts to obtain credit, though successful minority applicants actually required fewer 
applications than their white cohorts.  Multivariate regression also finds that different firm, 
lender, banking relationship, and loan characteristics affect the continued search for credit by 
minority- and white-owned small firms.   
 
 
Keywords: minority, small firms, credit search, discouraged borrower, persistence 
JEL classification: G20, M13, M20 
 
Contact: Grace Kim, Dept. of Economics & Finance, Merrick School of Business, Univ. of 
Baltimore, Email: gkim@ubalt.edu, Office: (410) 837-6563  
 
 
91
The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance Volume 15, Issue 2, Winter 2011 
 
  
Minority Small-Firm Credit Applicants: Does Persistence Pay? 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Do minority-owned small firms become discouraged after denial of credit from a 
financial institution?  This study explores the credit search behavior of minority-owned firms in 
comparison to other firms.  Minority-owned firms have become increasingly important to well-
developed economies as well as emerging markets (Carney, 2007).  Minority-owned firms 
comprised only 7 percent of all firms in the United States in 1982 but more than 15 percent of 
the 20.8 million firms by 1997 and 18 percent of the 23 million firms by 2002.  Although 
government programs may be partially responsible, much of the growth accompanied the rise in 
the U.S. minority population, which was 30.9% of the total U.S. population in 1997.  The trend 
indicates continued faster growth in the numbers of minority-owned small firms (Didia, 2008; 
Fairlie, 2004), particularly Hispanic-owned and Asian-owned ones.   
Nearly a quarter of all U.S. firms had paid employees, while slightly more than 20 
percent of minority-owned firms generated more than 4.7 million payroll jobs, many of them 
filled by minorities (U.S. Small Business Administration, 2007).  The majority of these employer 
firms are small businesses, with a total employee size of less than 500, 21 employees on average 
for nonminority-owned firms and less than 10 for minority-owned firms in 2002.  They 
contributed nearly $600 billion in revenues to the economy and offered a self-employment 
avenue for minority owners.
1
   
However, an impediment to minority business ownership and performance relative to 
white-owned businesses (Fairlie and Robb, 2007) is still the lack of financing, particularly 
formal external finance (Eknanem, 1992).  Only two-thirds of minority small firms used credit 
overall, with nearly 25 percent of minority small firms using bank credit (U.S. Small Business 
Administration, 2007).  Although the incidence of bank credit has been diminishing, with trade 
credit as a substitute (Hussain and Matlay, 2007), bank credit remains the primary source of 
formal external finance to small firms and of overall credit in terms of volume of credit (Berger 
and Udell, 1998; Federal Reserve Board, 2002). 
Studies suggest that discouraged minority-owned small firms do not even apply for 
formal credit because of expected denial (Kon and Storey, 2003; Coleman, 2004; Cavalluzzo et 
al., 2002).
 
 Such discouraged behavior may be rational self-selection (Han, Stuart, and Storey, 
2009).  Recent studies also confirm that such firms face greater difficulties in obtaining credit 
than do white-owned ones (e.g., Lussier, Greenberg, and Corman, 1998; Cavalluzzo and 
Cavalluzzo, 1998; Cavalluzzo, Cavalluzzo, and Wolken, 2002; Smallbone et al., 2003).  The 
outcome-based measures used only indicate that minorities do not even apply or are rejected in 
greater proportion when they do apply.  There is no measure of how they react to a credit 
application denial, i.e., whether they continue to seek credit or not. 
 This study addresses whether minority-owned firms are persistent in their efforts to 
obtain credit and how their efforts compare to those of their white counterparts.  Persistence here 
is measured by the number of financial institutions applied to for credit before success in 
                                               
1 All figures are from the Minorities in Business: A Demographic Review of Minority Business Ownership 2007 
report by the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA), comparable to those in the SBA’s Minorities in Business 
2001 report. Minority-owned firms here are those that are more than 51 percent owned in terms of ownership 
concentration by owners who are identified as a racial minority, while white-owned firms are those that are more 
than 51 percent owned in terms of ownership concentration by owners who are identified as not a racial minority. 
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obtaining credit or quitting the search.  Among those who are ultimately successful, more 
persistence may indicate greater difficulties to become successful. Greater persistence among 
those who are continually unsuccessful may indicate their being less discouraged, not quitting 
the search for credit when denied.   
The analysis indicates that proportionately more minority-owned firms than white-owned 
firms are persistent. To be successful, they cannot afford to be discouraged.  Generally, 
successful firms are persistent.  It also examines factors that may explain differences in credit 
application persistence among minority-owned firms and among white-owned firms. 
 The relevant literature is discussed in the following section.  Section III describes the data 
set.  Then Section IV describes the credit outcomes and credit application persistence.  Section V 
presents the empirical estimation model with discussion of the variables, followed by the results 
in Section VI and concluding remarks in Section VII. 
 
II. Relevant Literature 
 
 To date numerous studies have considered minority-owned small firms as discouraged 
borrowers that fear denial of credit and thus do not even apply (Coleman, 2002; Fraser, 2009).  
Other reasons for not applying include disinterest (Bond and Townsend, 1996) or sufficient 
alternative financing sources, including retained earnings or trade credit (Coleman, 2004).  Other 
literature finds that minority firms that do apply for credit are more likely to experience denial of 
credit (Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo, 1998; Squires and O’Connor, 2001; Cohn and Coleman, 
2001; Park and Coleman, 2009), to receive smaller amounts of credit (Bates, 1996; Lussier et al., 
1998), and to face worse terms and conditions of credit (Blanchflower et al., 2003)
2
.   
Very few papers examine the continued search for credit due to the paucity of related 
panel data.  In a qualitative study Buttner and Rosen (1992) consider the perceptions of male and 
female entrepreneurs in terms of strategies after denial of bank credit and find that they are rather 
similar in wanting to seek funding from another bank.  Hanley and Crook (2005) find that the 
cost of repeat finance is higher than that for the first round of credit received by entrepreneurs in 
general.  No study known by the author considers the minority-owned firms’ actual behavior 
after denial.  This paper considers the repeated credit applications by minority firms to determine 
whether such persistence results in success.  Their experience is compared to white-owned small 
firms to determine if minority firms have to be more persistent in a search for credit.  
   
III. Data  
 
 The data come from the 1995 National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) 
survey of its member firms’ financing experiences.3  The available data set of 3,642 small firms 
offers firm-level observations of a random sample of its more than 600,000 members nationwide.  
The survey is unique particularly with regard to different aspects of relationships between 
borrowing firms and their financial institutions. 
                                               
2 Smallbone et al. (2003), however, find some convergence in these credit experiences between ethnic minority 
businesses and white-owned businesses in the United Kingdom and more variation among the ethnic minority 
businesses instead. 
3 The Federal Reserve's Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF) data set is comparable in size to the NFIB, but 
along with other differences in survey coverage, the SSBF does not offer count data that is material to measuring 
persistence in terms of number of institutions applied to. 
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 Firms of unidentifiable employee size, over 500 employees, or unspecified firm owner’s 
race were excluded from the sample.  Those with unknown credit application outcomes also 
were not included.  Minority-owned businesses here refer to those small firms that are primarily 
owned by a racial minority owner/s in terms of ownership concentration, specifically 51 percent 
ownership.  Alternative measures have recently been suggested to determine what constitutes a 
minority entrepreneur, including links to the ethnic community (Chaganti and Greene, 2002) and 
smaller ownership concentrations (Sonfield, 2005), though these are not official government 
measures or widespread in the research literature.  The survey data set offers answers about the 
persistence of applicants seeking credit from financial institutions.  Those with unknown credit 
application outcomes were not included either. The final working sample includes 3,113 firms, 
with 2,918 owned by whites, and 195 firms owned by minorities.   
Full observations are not available for all minority-owned firms to warrant separate 
empirical analysis between different minority or gender subgroups. Also the data preclude a 
panel data set construct of serial credit experiences over time.  However, these limitations do not 
affect the findings. 
 
IV. Credit Outcomes and Application Persistence 
 
The credit outcomes for firms in this study mirror those comparative results in previous  
studies.  Discouraged borrowers are those not inclined to apply for credit from a financial 
institution due to fear of denial.  Nearly nine percent of minority-owned firms did not apply for 
such credit. Since reasons are not specified, it cannot be determined how many were discouraged 
borrowers.  However, the same proportion of white-owned firms also did not apply.  Such firms 
generally sought credit from friends, relatives, other individuals, or other unspecified sources. 
While more than 10 percent of the sample white-owned firms that did apply are unable to 
obtain credit, 20.5% of minority-owned firms are unsuccessful in their most recent credit search.  
Their self-reported difficulties are more striking, as 38.8% of minority-owned firms were unable 
to satisfy credit needs consistently, compared to only 24.7% of white-owned firms.  These 
outcomes indicate that minority-owned firms face greater credit constraints.   
The repeated credit application outcomes also somewhat confirm the findings about 
credit difficulties for minority-owned firms.  Table 1 presents a statistical summary of credit 
application persistence by the small firms, which shows differences between ultimately 
successful and unsuccessful applicants.  Among the successful credit applicants, 29.3% of 
minority-owned firms tried more than one institution before becoming successful, whereas only 
19.9% of such white-owned firms had to exert such credit search efforts.  Similarly, a higher 
percentage of successful minority-owned borrowers than white-owned borrowers had to go to 
more than two institutions.  These group differences are significant and suggest that 
proportionately more minority borrowers had to be persistent in their credit search than their 
white counterparts, despite rather similar compositions of being incorporated and being of large 
asset size.  Summary statistics from Table II indicate that minority firms were younger and were 
more likely to be female-owned.   
However, the average number of tries by these successful minority-owned firms was 
consistently smaller than that of the successful white-owned firms (see Table I).  This was true 
even when truncated means were considered to account for the outliers.  This indicates that 
where ultimately successful small-firm borrowers faced difficulties, white-owned firms had to be 
more persistent in their credit applications than did minority-owned firms.  This could be 
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explained in part by Table II summary statistics that indicate that white firms demanded larger 
loans, from smaller lenders, and did not enjoy increased competition among lenders. 
The picture of persistence for unsuccessful firms is less nuanced.  As many as 56.0% of 
ultimately unsuccessful white-owned firms tried repeated institutions before quitting (see Table 
I).  Minority-owned firms were more likely to persist in their credit search, with 62.9% of them 
trying more than one institution before quitting.  This finding was also true with respect to firms 
that applied to more than two institutions and more than three institutions for credit.  The average 
number of tries by minority-owned firms was also greater than that of white-owned firms across 
different degrees of persistence.  According to Table II, no significant differences in summary 
statistics were found between these minority and white-owned firms to suggest greater 
difficulties for minority applicants.  Overall, minority borrowers are less easily discouraged than 
fear-of-denial studies suggest.  Persistence itself does not necessarily lead to a successful 
application outcome however. 
 
V. Empirical Analysis 
  
The logit regression estimation equation is specified for two measures of persistence, 
with one measure indicating applicants who tried more than one institution (i =1), meaning two 
or more, and the other measure indicating those who tried more than two institutions (i = 2), 
specifically three or more, as follows:  
Yi= β0i + ΣβijXij + εi, where i = 1, 2; j = 1, 2,..,10.                                      (1) 
Yi  is the binary dependent variable corresponding to the respective measure of application 
persistence.  Xij is the jth control variable, among ten identified from the survey responses of 
small firms that represent characteristics of the firm, financial institution, and financing 
relationship, with constant β0 and error term ε.   
 
 A. Variables           
Table III provides a description of the variables, and Tables IV and V offer descriptive 
statistics.  With the available data, differences in credit application persistence are assessed after 
controlling first for firm characteristics that affect the small firm’s ability to obtain credit.  Being 
incorporated offers the firm's credit history from public information (Blanchflower et al., 2003).  
More years owned indicates greater business experience of the owner and greater probability of 
survival that reduces the risk of default to the lender.  Winker (1999) thus finds that firm age 
reduces the credit rationing probability for firms, as does size.  Greater asset value indicates 
potentially greater collateralizable value in case of default (Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo, 1998).  
Reflecting better borrower creditworthiness, these factors are thus expected to reduce the number 
of tries necessary to obtain credit. 
 Next, among the financial institution characteristics, per-borrower lending limits imposed 
by the lender may leave the borrower with unfulfilled needs when a larger loan is requested 
(Lussier et al.,1998).   Although a larger financial institution in terms of asset size is better able 
to accommodate a larger loan request, such a larger institution’s lending focus may not 
necessarily be oriented toward small firms.
4
  Coleman (2002) also considers the financial 
institution asset size with regard to small firm credit constraints, though with more of a focus on 
the financial institution than on the small firm.  Greater competition among lenders reduces a 
                                               
4 In a theoretical study, Besci et al. (2005) also indicate that the bargaining ability of lenders and borrowers depends 
on the average funds available per lender.   
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small firm's probability of becoming a lender’s captive (Sharpe, 1990) and increases alternative 
sources of credit access that make it easier to shop around.  All these factors are likely to require 
or encourage borrower credit search persistence.   
 The third category of characteristics represents the financing relationship.  Using a larger 
number of banks for financial services weakens the firm’s financing relationship with its primary 
financial institution (Petersen and Rajan, 1994).  This causes the credit process to become more 
purely transaction based and induces borrower persistence.  Finally, the owners’ conduct of 
personal banking with the firm’s financial institution offers information value, though limited, 
about the firm’s creditworthiness and requires less borrower persistence.   
Ownership race is used as a dummy explanatory variable, as is ownership gender.  To the 
extent that minority-owned firms and female-owned firms face greater credit difficulties, such 
firms will require a greater number of tries to obtain credit, though they may be discouraged 
from doing so.
5 
   
 
B. Descriptive Statistics 
Minority-owned firms were somewhat less likely to be incorporated than white-owned 
firms and to be slightly smaller in asset size.  Generally the two groups of firms used similar 
numbers of banks for their financial services.  Otherwise, however, the differences between the 
two groups were statistically significant, as reported in Table IV.  Minority-owned firms were 
younger with higher percentages of female-ownership.  A larger percentage of the minority 
firms' owners conducted personal banking at the firm's bank.  The minority-owned firms also 
demanded smaller loans, had larger primary lenders, and enjoyed greater lender competition.  
Minority-owned firms thus would not unequivocally need to be more persistent in their credit 
search than white-owned firms. 
Minority-owned firms were not generally different from white-owned firms in applying 
for credit.  Although white-owned firms requested larger loans on average, and proportionately 
more minority owners conducted personal banking at the firm's bank, these differences were not 
significant.  Rather increased lender competition for minority-owned firms and a higher 
percentage of female owners distinguished the two groups of firms.  See Table V for differences 
between groups of firms that tried 1 institution or not.   
However, minority-owned firms that tried repeated financial institutions were quite 
different from white-owned firms that also tried repeated institutions (See Table V).  Such 
minority-owned firms were more likely than white-owned firms to be unincorporated, younger, 
and have smaller asset values.  At the same time, because they requested much smaller loans, did 
business with larger asset-sized financial institutions, and had owners that conducted personal 
banking at the firm's bank, there would be less need for credit search persistence by such 
minority-owned firms. Gender was not a distinguishing factor between these more persistent 
groups of firms.   
 
VI. Results 
  
Table VI presents the multivariate regression results.  Results for all firms indicate the 
pooled regression results.  The predictive accuracy of the regression estimation was 77.0 percent. 
                                               
5 Because no significant difference was found in number of tries between minority females and minority males or 
between white females and white males, an interaction term minority owner*female owner was not deemed to be 
appropriate here. 
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The estimation model’s accuracy measures where the model correctly predicted that numerous 
financial institutions would likely be applied to and actually were applied to for credit, or where 
it predicted that only one institution would likely be applied to and actually was applied to in the 
credit search by the small firm.  This suggests that the model is better than chance at determining 
the likelihood of credit search persistence. 
Race of the owner is significant in affecting credit search persistence, by increasing the 
probability of the firm’s trying, applying to more than one financial institution for credit.  The 
results are similar for firms primarily owned by females.  As expected, being incorporated, years 
of business ownership, and a firm's large asset size each reduce persistence, while the size of the 
loan requested, and the number of bank relationships increase persistence.  Although a larger 
lender will have greater capacity to meet loan requests and thus reduce a firm’s credit search 
efforts, its loan portfolio may be oriented away from small-firm lending and increase a small 
firm’s need to make credit applications to numerous institutions.  Contrary to conventional 
expectation, personal banking by the firm's owners actually increases persistence, though this 
result is not significant.  Such banking may not be beneficial to obtaining credit if it is 
compulsory and not associated with the firm’s actual creditworthiness.  
These results are otherwise robust to a greater degree of persistence, where firms tried 
more than two institutions, i.e., applied to three or more institutions for credit.  Lender 
competition and female ownership become significant in increasing credit search persistence. 
Race remains a significant factor in positively affecting credit search persistence. Thus, separate 
regressions are conducted to understand variation among white-owned firms and among 
minority-owned firms. 
 Table VI also presents the regression estimates for white-owned firms.  The  predictive 
accuracy of the model increases to 90.0 percent.  Since this group represents 93% of the total 
sample, the test results are similar to all firms.  Specifically, most of those significant variables 
remain unchanged, including borrower’s asset size, requested loan size, number of relationship 
banks, and gender.  However, for white-owned firms, years owned and lender asset size no 
longer matter, while personal banking emerges as somewhat significant in increasing borrower 
persistence.  Such banking may not beneficial to obtaining credit if it is compulsory and not 
correlated with the firm’s actual creditworthiness.  The results for firms which tried more than 
two financial institutions for credit are almost identical, in terms of significant variables.    
 Table VI also presents the regression results for minority-owned firms.  The predictive 
accuracy of the estimation model remains above 75 percent.  Quite different from the results of 
white owned firms, the only variables significant are years of ownership and the firm’s large 
asset size.  They are direct indices of ability to repay credit and thus reduce the need for 
borrower persistence as expected.  Results for those minority-owned firms that tried more than 
two financial institutions are similar.  A small firm’s larger asset size remains significant, while 
lender competition emerges as significant in increasing the probability of credit search 
persistence.  The ability to seek alternate lenders increases the likelihood of applying to 
numerous institutions. 
 
VII. Conclusions 
 
In conclusion, differences in credit application persistence between minority- and white-
owned firms are significant.  As a group minority-owned firms require more credit search efforts 
than white-owned firms.  This result further underscores the difficulty of such firms in obtaining 
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formal financing.  However, when only successful borrowers are considered, minority-owned 
firm require less effort than white-owned ones.  Although not as statistically significant, even 
with continued denial, minority firms are also more persistent than white-owned firms.  This 
result suggests that minority firms that do apply are not easily discouraged and should not be.   
Thus, minority ownership is a significant explanatory factor in the persistence of all the 
small firms.  According to the multivariate regression results, relatively different significant 
factors affect credit application persistence for white-owned and minority-owned firms.  Overall, 
incorporated, older white-owned firms with larger asset values are less likely to apply to more 
than one institution, while those having relationships with more banks are more persistent, as are 
those requesting larger loans and those owned by females.  Personal banking by the owners does 
not appear to benefit these white-owned firms.  For minority-owned firms, age is more beneficial 
to obtaining credit, as is a larger asset size.  Both factors thus reduce these firms' need to persist 
in obtaining credit.  However, lender competition uniquely only affects the likelihood of 
minority-owned firms’ persistence. 
The findings indicate that only looking at the nonparticipation of discouraged borrowers 
in the credit market and a single credit application outcome will lead to incomplete and 
misleading conclusions by policymakers and researchers about minority-owned firms’ 
experience with external finance from financial institutions.  Although these firms are more 
likely to be discouraged from participating in the credit market, they are not discouraged from 
continuing to participate in the market once they do so.  The results also indicate that comparing 
minority-owned firms to white-owned firms requires assessment of differences among minority-
owned firms themselves.  Minority-owned firms that do apply for credit are not the same as 
those that do not apply for fear of denial.  Furthermore, firms that are persistent in their credit 
search are distinguishable from those that only apply once.  Future research might consider 
additional subsets of the minority-owned firms to compare the 5.8% of firms majority owned by 
Hispanics, 4.4% by Asian-Americans, 4.0% by African Americans, and the 0.9% by American 
Indians in the United States for example.
6
  As panel data sets become available, an additional 
extension should consider if credit search persistence is necessary and worthwhile over the small 
firm’s lifecycle to reconcile the viability and performance differences between minority-owned 
and white-owned small firms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
6 Note of course that these subsets themselves do not list further subdivisions by ethnic grouping. 
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Table I 
 
Credit search persistence 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Successful firms 
No. of institutions                                         Between group 
applied to  All firms (A)     White firms (W)   Minority firms (M)  equality tests (WM)                
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Tried 1               79.6%      80.1%         70.7%  0.133 
More than 1  20.4%      19.9%         29.3%              6.302**   
     Median no. of tries 2      2                      2                           0.589 
     Mean no. of tries 3.3(6.605)     3.3(6.880)         2.8(1.063)     134731.5*** 
Tried 2   12.2%      12.0%         15.0%              0.801 
More than 2    8.2%      7.9%                  14.3%              6.025** 
     Median no. of tries 3      3          3                           0.343  
     Mean no. of tries       5.1(10.139)     5.3(10.657)         3.6(1.017)    139213.0*** 
Tried 3               4.9%                  4.6%          9.0%              4.394** 
More than 3  3.4%                  3.3%          5.3%              0.987 
     Median no. of tries 4                  4          4                           0.627 
     Mean no. of tries      8.2(15.382)      8.5(16.067)         4.6(1.134)    145785.5 
N (those which tried)     2370                      2237                   133 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Unsuccessful firms 
No. of institutions                                         Between group 
applied to  All firms (A)     White firms (W)   Minority firms (M)  equality tests (WM)                
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Tried 1   43.3%      44.0%         37.1%             0.041 
More than 1  56.7%      56.0%         62.9%             0.352 
     Median no. of tries 3                  2          3              0.481 
     Mean no. of tries       2.9(1.316)     2.9(1.277)         3.2(1.571)       4628.500 
Tried 2   27.9%      28.2%         25.7%             0.011 
More than 2  28.8%      27.8%         37.1%             0.905  
     Median no. of tries 3                  3          3              0.453 
     Mean no. of tries       3.8(1.344)     3.8(1.313)         4.1(1.553)       4506.500 
Tried 3   17.2%      16.9%         20.0%             0.049 
More than 3  11.6%      10.9%         17.1%             0.649  
     Median no. of tries 4      4          5              0.429 
     Mean no. of tries       5.0(1.453)     4.9(4.936)         5.3(1.506)       4660.500 
N (those which tried)     319                   284                        35  
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: Standard deviation in parentheses. 
          Chi-squared test conducted for equality between group proportions. 
          Kolmogorov-Smirnov test conducted for equality between group medians.  
          Mann-Whitney U test conducted for equality between group means. 
Differences were significant at the 1% level***, at the 5% level**, and at the 10% level*. 
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Table II 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Successful credit applicant firms and Unsuccessful credit applicant firms 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________  
 
Explanatory  All successful firms      White firms      Minority firms             Equality         
variables                     Tests        
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Incorporated                          64.9%            64.9%  63.4%            0.091 
 
Years owned                          16.2      16.3   14.4            1.474**KS 
              (13.026)      (13.073)  (12.125) 
Large asset value                          57.3%      57.3%  57.8%            0.001 
 
Loan size request                          445,283      462,976  147,697  173619.500* 
              (4392856.01)     (4518916.93)  (563338.188) 
Lender asset size                    6,956,000,000     6,886,000,000  8,021,000,000           1.369**KS 
              (17790000000)     (18140000000) (11440000000) 
Lender competition                      40.0%      39.6%  46.7%            2.740* 
 
Number of banks                          1.4        1.4     1.5  195137.000 
              (0.754)      (0.742)  (0.930) 
Personal banking                         68.2%      67.8%  75.5%            3.584* 
 
Female owner                            9.8%                     9.2%   20.8%          20.795*** 
 
Minority owner                            5.6% 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Explanatory  All unsuccessful firms  White firms   Minority firms            Equality   
variables                    Tests        
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Incorporated                          59.9%      60.2%  57.5%           0.024 
 
Years owned                          13.0      13.3   10.9     5601.500 
              (12.616)      (13.002)  (8.921) 
Large asset value                          38.1%      39.9%  25.0%           2.695 
 
Loan size request                          412,493      454,151  88,600     5192.000 
              (5293853.36)     (5623418.63)  (151380.790) 
Lender asset size                    12,340,000,000     11,900,000,000 15,810,000,000    1840.000 
              (28720000000)     (28510000000) (30690000000) 
Lender competition                       37.9%      37.1%  44.4%           0.454 
 
Number of banks                           1.4                      1.4     1.2     5242.000 
              (0.740)      (0.765)  (0.474) 
Personal banking                         64.0%       63.2%  70.3%           0.439 
 
Female owner                          14.8%                    14.5%  17.5%           0.074 
 
Minority owner                          11.4% 
Note: Standard deviation in parentheses. 
          Chi-squared test conducted for equality between group proportions. 
          Mann-Whitney U test conducted for equality between group means. 
          KSKolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic where Mann-Whitney U test was not applicable.  
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Differences were significant at the 1% level***, at the 5% level**, and at the 10% level. 
 
Table III 
 
Description of variables 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Variables    Coded   Definition 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Dependent Variables    
Tried more than one financial institution Dummy   applied to more than one financial institution  
tried=1, not=0  before successful or stopped trying 
   
Tried more than two financial institutions Dummy                 applied to more than two institutions 
     tried=1, not=0  before successful or stopped trying 
 
Explanatory Variables 
Incorporated    Dummy   legal form of business is corporation 
     yes=1, not=1 
 
Years owned    Scale   how long current owner owned this business 
     years 
 
Large asset value    Dummy   total asset value of firm at end of last fiscal 
     yes=1, not=0  year $200,000 or more 
 
Loan size request    Scale   loan amount requested 
     dollars 
 
Lender asset size    Scale   how large firm's principal financial  
dollars   institution is in terms of its assets 
 
Lender competition   Dummy   more competition for firm's business 
     yes=1, not=0  among financial institutions from before 
 
Number of banks    Scale   how many banks firm uses to obtain 
      whole numbers  its financial services 
 
Personal banking    Dummy   does the owner/s conduct personal banking 
     yes=1, not=0  at the firm's principal bank 
 
Female owner    Dummy   principal owner/s of business female 
     yes=1, not=0   
 
Minority owner    Dummy   principal owner/s of business African 
     yes=1, not=0  American, Hispanic American, or other 
        minority 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table IV 
 
Descriptive Statistics  
for the sample  
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                All firms                 White firms        Minority firms           Equality        
Explanatory                     Tests 
variables               
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
             
Incorporated                          64.3%          64.4%  62.2%            0.577   
 
Years owned                          15.8          16.0  13.7            1.449**KS 
              (13.018)          (13.096)  (11.608) 
Large asset value                          55.2%          55.5%  50.8%            1.380 
 
Loan size request                          $441,586          462,035  135,574  242995.000** 
              (4502518.89)         (4648022.99) (507046.520) 
Lender asset size                    $7,610,000,000         7,465,000,000 9,605,000,000           1.695***KS 
              (19520000000)         (19670000000) (17290000000) 
Lender competition                       39.8%          39.3%  46.3%            3.273* 
 
Number of banks                           1.4                         1.4    1.4  275596.000 
              (0.752)          (0.745)  (0.864) 
Personal banking                         67.7%          67.3%  74.5%            3.846** 
 
Female owner                          10.4%            9.7%  20.1%          19.873*** 
 
Minority owner                            6.3% 
 
N observations             3113          2918  195 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: Standard deviation in parentheses. 
          Chi-squared test conducted for equality between group proportions. 
          Mann-Whitney U test conducted for equality between group means. 
          KSKolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic where Mann-Whitney U test was not applicable.  
Differences were significant at the 1% level***, at the 5% level**, and at the 10% level*. 
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Table V 
 
Descriptive Statistics for firms that tried (applied to) 1 financial institution and tried (applied to) more than 1  
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Explanatory             All firms tried 1           White firms         Minority firms              Equality             
Variables                     Tests        
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Incorporated                          65.5%       65.2%  72.0%            1.771 
 
Years owned                          16.4       16.4   16.3  102074.000 
             (13.021)       (12.999)  (13.463) 
Large asset value                          57.0%       56.6%  63.7%            1.714 
 
Loan size request                         288,550       294,286  185,766  96590.500 
             (3069009.73)      (3149475.13)  (682266.367) 
Lender asset size                   6,834,000,000      6,826,000,000  6,962,000,000 31332.500 
             (115910000000)      (16210000000) (9838000000) 
Lender competition                      40.1%       39.5%  51.0%          4.934** 
 
Number of banks                          1.4         1.4     1.4  99758.000 
             (0.721)       (0.718)  (0.777) 
Personal banking                        69.5%       69.3%  72.8%          0.415 
 
Female owner                           9.3%                      8.7%  19.6%        13.010*** 
 
Minority owner             5.3% 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Explanatory             All firms tried>1         White firms       Minority firms               Equality               
Variables                                               Tests        
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Incorporated                          63.0%       64.4%  48.3%           5.386** 
 
Years owned                          13.9       14.3     9.9           1.336*KS 
             (12.823)       (13.185)  (7.414) 
Large asset value                          49.8%       52.1%  27.1%         12.368*** 
              
Loan size request                          912,711       997,629    71,885           1.942***KS 
              (7272486.72)      (7626221.79)  (117129.003) 
Lender asset size                    10,780,000,000      10,490,000,000 13,610,000,000          1.398**KS 
              (28900000000)      (29150000000) (26550000000) 
Lender competition                       40.3%       40.5%  37.9%           0.061 
 
Number of banks                           1.5         1.6     1.5   16497.500 
              (0.845)       (0.816)  (1.104) 
Personal banking                         60.4%       58.6%  78.0%           7.615*** 
 
Female owner                          11.7%       11.1%  18.3%           2.106 
 
Minority owner                            9.2% 
Note: Standard deviation in parentheses. 
          Chi-squared test conducted for equality between group proportions. 
          Mann-Whitney U test conducted for equality between group means. 
          KSKolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic where Mann-Whitney U test was not applicable.  
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Differences were significant at the 1% level***, at the 5% level**, and at the 10% level*. 
 
Table VI 
 
Logit regression results 
Dependent variable Tried>1=tried (applied to) more than one financial institution (or not) in credit search 
Dependent variable Tried>2=tried (applied to) more than two financial institutions (or not) in credit search 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                All firms                    White firms          Minority firms                
Explanatory      Expected       Tried    Tried            Tried  Tried          Tried          Tried  
variables      sign               >1    >2            >1  >2           >1 >2 
                
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Constant             5.575***   6.594***    6.612***   6.783***     4.125       9.713*** 
                           (54.084)    (43.416)        (64.840)   (45.326)        (2.213)       (6.856) 
Incorporated                          0.246*   0.013             0.206  0.055           0.763         0.198 
 (yes=1)               (2.832)    (0.004)          (1.788)   (0.063)          (1.976)       (0.087) 
Years owned                        -0.014**   0.012          0.011*  -0.009          0.041      0.052 
               (5.524)    (2.162)          (3.526)   (1.139)          (1.948)       (1.718) 
Large asset value                          0.645***    0.603***         0.584***    0.541**          1.151**     1.010 
 (yes=1)               (17.686)    (8.028)          (13.190)   (5.817)          (4.269)       (1.897) 
Log loan size request      +             0.330***     0.369***       0.349***     0.370***        0.081          0.350 
               (49.655)    (38.685)        (50.253)   (35.347)        (0.194)       (2.567) 
Log lender asset size       ±             0.048    0.031            0.038   0.012          0.106           0.208 
               (2.449)    (0.524)          (1.390)   (0.074)          (0.869)        (2.023) 
Lender competition         +             0.085    0.393**           0.052   0.321          0.641           1.268* 
 (yes=1)               (0.382)    (3.943)          (0.130)   (2.386)          (1.438)        (2.809) 
Number of banks             +            0.395***     0.372***         0.388***     0.361***       0.370          0.431                
               (20.011)    (11.890)          (16.125)   (8.704)          (2.233)        (2.670) 
Personal banking                         0.320**    0.201            0.397***   0.225            0.711         0.190 
 (yes=1)               (5.367)    (1.106)          (7.712)   (1.277)          (1.137)       (0.055) 
Female owner             +           - 0.213        -0.579**      -0.308          -0.698***        0.182         -0.272 
 (yes=1)               (1.117)    (5.168)          (2.060)   (6.644)          (0.090)       (0.123) 
Minority owner             +            -0.616***    -0.599** 
 (yes=1)               (6.595)    (3.843) 
 
Model χ2             109.708***  70.500***    99.086***   59.351***      22.005***  14.311 
Log-likelihood             1387.365      833.298        1270.733     754.827          71.183        71.083  
N              1350    1350           1257  1257           93               93 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: Wald test statistic values are in parentheses.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at  the 1%, 5%, and     
          10% significance levels, respectively. 
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